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DUALISTIC DEVELOPMENT IN UAE AND GCC1
Suleiman Ibrahim Cohen2
Abstract. This paper attempts to draw up and apply an analytical framework for tracing and
understanding duality features in the resource rich labour short developing country. The focus is on UAE
and GCC,. The framework is guided by (a) a simple model at the macro level that highlights duality
tendencies in terms of the composition of high skilled and low skilled labour and their diverging
productivities, and (b) an inter-industry analysis at the sector level.
The paper elaborates further on whether dualistic development matters; and if it matters, what should
be the optimal degree of dualism in a given context. As there is no simple answer to this issue an
empiricist approach is followed by which various comparative indicators relating to duality are reviewed,
rescaled and aggregated for UAE and GCC. The indicators show a significantly higher duality of UAE
than in neighbouring countries.
Duality in UAE is explained in terms of a more open market for foreign labour and capital that reinforce
each other, and which have highly contrasting and opposite effects on factor productivity; next to built-in
inter-industry mechanisms that work in the same direction.
1. Introduction
By a dualistic economy is meant a highly structured economy containing a relatively concentrated modern
segment with high and rising factor productivities, next to a traditional segment covering many workers in
tiny enterprises with low and declining productivities. The notion has wide application to developing
countries with poor natural resources and an oversupply of labour, and is basic to theorizing and
understanding the process of development in these countries, Kelly et al. (1089).
In general, there has been little attention devoted to the emergence of duality features and problems in
developing countries with rich natural resources and an undersupply of labour such as the GCC. Focusing
on UAE in particular, this paper attempts to draw up and apply a framework for tracing and understanding
duality features in the resource rich labour short developing country. The framework is guided by (a) a
simple model at the macro level that highlights duality tendencies in terms of the composition of more
1
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skilled and less skilled labour and their diverging productivities, and (b) an analysis at the sector level that
identifies sectors behind the increasing dualities.
The paper elaborates further on whether a dualistic development matters; and if it matters, what should
be the optimal degree of dualism in a given context.
The paper then extends the scope of duality to consider the relative performances of what can be called
the ‘old’ economy and the ‘new’ economy. The latter is technologically much more advanced, is more
information based, and is more recent in its evolvement and growth. An empiricist approach is followed by
which various comparative indicators relating to duality of the old and new are reviewed, rescaled and
aggregated for UAE and GCC. The indicators will show a significantly higher duality in UAE than in GCC:
i.e. a lagging old economy in UAE compared to GCC, but a much more advanced and leaping new economy
in UAE compared to GCC.
2. A macro level analysis of dualistic development in GCC type countries
Dualistic models, developed by Lewis and Ranis in the 1950’s, were rightly applied to the classic case of
a resource poor surplus labour developing country. The premises of the model are (a) a large population
in the traditional agriculture sector earning an income above marginal productivity, so that an outflow of
labour will not affect production; (b) firms in the modern industrial sector, working with increasing
capital intensity, will hire and train this labour surplus and pay a wage equal to their marginal
productivity. The development process is then seen as a transfer of labour from the low productivity
sector to the high productivity sector, with a likely widening of the dualistic gap between the two sectors,
other things remaining the same. Due to this duality, economic growth may not necessarily signal a
general improvement in welfare for all participants. Under favourable conditions and over time counter
transfers and linked markets can occur, thus contributing to an integration of the economy and a more
equitably distributed welfare.
In the last five decades dualistic analysis was extended to cover the division between the formal and
informal sectors, as well as emphasis on marginalisation tendencies, and urban bias. cf. Sethurahman
(1981), de Soto (1989), and Lipton (1977), respectively. But the main contours distinguishing dualism in
the overpopulated poor developing country remained intact: the coexistence of a low productivity
lagging sector housing the larger portion of a less skilled labour force, next to a high productivity growth
sector with skilled labour.
We attempt here to formulate an analytical framework for dualistic development for the case of the
resource rich labour short developing country, for example the UAE, or generally the GCC. The formal-
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informal dichotomy and its manifestations are also common in this rich region, though the mechanisms
behind this dualism are totally different from the classical case of the poor country.
To start with, a simplified macro model of dualistic development in GCC context in six equations is
displayed. This is a conceptual model meant to catch the very basic features. These are (a) the exogenous
effects of favourable oil revenues on the modern economy, in particular higher consumption, higher capital
intensive investment, and often outward growth in invisible services, requiring import of foreign high
productivity skilled manpower at world market clearance rates whereby remuneration equals marginal
productivity; (b) the modern economy imports as well foreign unskilled labour with a lower opportunity
cost than its marginal productivity; (c) this foreign unskilled labour falls back on a traditional economy for
their consumption needs given their low levels of remuneration and high remittances; and (d) this creating
furthermore a multiplier demand effect for more foreign unskilled labour in the informal economy to satisfy
its increased consumption demands .
The result of (a) to (d) is a heightened expansion of both the modern and traditional economies, more
foreign labour inflow, and relatively more so of low skills than high skills, coupled with a growth in wage
discrepancies between the high and low productivity labour types.
Eq. 1 gives the GDP of the modern economy (non-oil), V m, as the sum of consumption, investment and
exports less imports. Consumption and investment depend on the GDP of oil and non-oil. This equation
determines Vm from the demand side. Eq.2 determines the stock of capital in the modern economy K m. Eq.3
determines the input of low skills in the modern economy, Lm, which is a wage bill divided by a sort of
exogenous minimum wage Wl that is equivalent to the opportunity cost of low skilled in the migrants’
countries. Eq. 4 is a production function. With V m, Km and Lm solved, the input of high skills H m is derived
from this production function.3 Turning to the traditional economy, eq.5 specifies the composition of its
GDP, Vn, as consisting of some consumption demand by the modern economy; consumption demand by
low skills who are assumed to spend their disposable income on traditional goods; and some investment in
the traditional sector. In eq. 6, employment in the traditional economy, Ln, is found from the wage share and
the exogenous minimum wage, and by adding up other exogenously known categories of informal workers
consisting of household helpers and unregistered workers, Ln1 and Ln2, respectively.
A macro model highlighting dualistic features in a resource rich labour short developing country
Indices: o , m, n subscripts for oil, modern and traditional sectors, respectively.
Endogenous variables: V= Value added, K= Capital, H= High skilled labour,
L= Low skilled labour (Lm in modern sector and Ln in traditional sector)
3
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Exogenous variables: Vo=value added of oil sector, Em= exports less imports of modern sector, Wl =
wage low skilled, Ln1. Ln2 = Informal sector household helpers and unregistered workers
Coefficients: α , β = marginal productivities of capital and high skilled labour
γ , ι = functional parameters for consumption and investment, δ = depreciation rate of capital
ρ = remittance share in labour income, π = profit share in value added
Equations:
Vm = γm (Vm + Vo ) + ι m ( Vm + Vo ) + Em

(1)

Km = (1- δm ) K m, t-1 + ι m ( Vm + Vo )

(2)

Lm = (1−α−β) Vm / Wl

(3)

Vm = Am Kmα Hm β Lm (1−α−β)
Vn = γn Vm + ( 1- ρn) Wl ( Lm + Ln ) + ιn Vn
Ln = (1+λn ) (πn Vn / Wl) + Ln1 + Ln2

(4)
(5)
(6)

3. A macro interpretation of recent trends in terms of dual sectors.
An indication of an increasing duality can be derived from the model in various ways. One way is to
examine a simple comparison between the trend of the wage rate of the high productivity labour that can be
denoted by Wh and that can be derived from eq.1, and the wage rate of the low productivity labour Wl. The
ratio of Wh to Wl tended to increase in recent years in the UAE, indicating a rise in duality. This is the result
of a wage rate paid to the high skill that is equal to its marginal productivity, while the wage rate for the low
skill is settled at a value equal to the opportunity cost of the low skilled in neighbouring countries that supply
this labour, increased by the transaction costs required to travel and obtain a work license. As this
opportunity cost tended to fall in recent years, the wage rate of the low skilled Wl has also fallen in real
terms and well below their marginal productivity.
Another measure of the increasing duality can be found in weighing the growth rates of W h and Wl by
the changing shares of H and L in the total labour force. This gives a measure of the changing concentration
of income shares. In UAE, and for many years, there has been a greater growth in the number of low skilled
L than in that of high skilled H; and given the widened gap between W l and Wh, it can be postulated that the
income distribution in UAE is likely to be more skew over time, implying an increase in duality.
Of course, a shortcut for tracing duality would be simply to relate the growth of labour productivity
in the modern to the traditional sectors. The problem is that it is not operationally feasible at the macro
level to separate and estimate the production of the two sectors apart, and that is why the sketched macro
model is basically a conceptual tool. However, an indirect indication of the increasing duality can be
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obtained from an aggregate picture combined with other observd facts. Table 3.1 shows for six recent
years a decline in the aggregate labour productivity to 70% of its initial value, or an average decline of
about 0.7% per year. Given the earlier mentioned positive growth in labour productivity in the modern
sector as reflected by the icreasing remuneration rate of the high skilled and their marginal pructivity,
then the labour productivity in the traditional sector must have diminished appreciably over the years, to
allow for this aggregate annual decline in labour productivity of 0.7%.
Table 3.1. Trends in labour productivity, UAE
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1998/93

GDP non-oil, mln aed
137659
140913
148679
164256
166884
154804
1.12
Labour 000s
859717
940844
1216854 1273750 1329503 1378495 1.60
Labour productivity
0.160
0.150
0.122
0.129
0.126
0.112
0.70
Growth of lab. productivity
0.935
0.816
1.055
0.973
0.895
0.935 (av)
Source: Compiled from Annual Economic Reports, Ministry of Planning. GDP at factor cost constant prices of
1990.

In the six years, there is a net addition of about 514000 workers, practically all of them are migrant
workers, with much of them absorbed by the traditional sector. The figures would imply that a large part of
the inflow of migrant workers in recent years did not bring an added value to the economy, and must have
gone to activities of lower productivity such as usually spread in the traditional sector.
How to justify and unify analytically the highly contrasting pictures on labour productivity in UAE? On
the one hand, there are the trends showing deterioration in productivity. On the other hand, there is observed
evidence on a healthy and growing economy. How can these contrasting pictures be unified?

The logical

harmonisation of these contrasting facts is in recognising that economic activities in UAE consist of highly
heterogeneous types of employed labour and capital, and that disaggregation of these activities into a leaping
commercially-run modern segment and a lagging traditional segment will uncover important realities. The
lion’s share of the declining labour productivity occurs in the lagging segment, which has attracted
significant inflows of foreign workers that are not matched with corresponding increases in the value added.
High degrees of overcrowding and underutilisation are among the manifestations. Several mechanisms in
the two segments sare described below .
The modern economy.

High growth due to oil revenues, high investment and increased invisible

exports lead to a pattern of capital intensive investment that raises demand for high skills but also
substitutes capital for labour, with the net effect being a positive demand for high skills Hm, as implied
in eqs.1, 2, 4. What is the case for low skills Lm? In the eighties and early nineties the country's labour
market was relatively tight leading to higher wages and lower returns on capital. With a more open
labour market since then, there has been a significant influx of cheap labour from low-income
neighbouring countries, which producers appreciate. There is a large stock of labour in neighbouring
countries with low opportunity costs and they are prepared to pay a premium to be allowed to migrate,
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enter the labour force and earn a basic income. One and the other have lead to a decline in the general
level of low skilled wages and a rise in profits. While labour productivity is falling, business profitability
has increased because of the intensified wage competition among the lower skills leading to more
employment Lm4, eq.3. The greater use of Lm may have substituted for some Hm as well, eq.4, causing
a further relative downgrading of the skill profile.
The traditional economy. All workers in the traditional economy Ln can be assumed to be of a low
productivity equivalent to Lm. Note that Lm is low productivity but they are aligned with the modern
segment, while eqs. 5 and 6 deal with other low skill in the traditional segment, Ln. There are several
common things about these categories apart from having the same low skill description. All L categories
receive W per worker which is equivalent to a low opportunity cost that applies in the countries of
migration. All L categories remit a substantial share of their income, r, back to the migrant country. All
L categories spend their consumption on low productivity goods and services provided by the informal
sector.
Among the low skilled informal workers, a distinction can be made between Ln1, Ln2, Ln3. These
are household helpers, unregistered workers, and the core informal workers in tiny enterprises catering
for production and services to low income earners.5 They are discussed below.
One category of informal workers is that of foreign housemaids, cooks, gardeners, and drivers. This
group increased appreciably due to the increased demand by higher income households and the modern
business sector for these household services. According to the population census of 1995, household helpers
counted 104 thousands, good for about 10% of foreign employment. 6 The importing household head submits
a request to the authorities to fetch a household helper, which request is granted. There is no formal market
for these transactions and the household head assumes legal and residential responsibilities for the imported
labour. To some extent, there may not be a realisable conversion of the earned income of these informal
workers into an additional value added to the GDP. It is also less likely that the spending households would
increase their own productivity appreciably and fully as a result of the personal service. Under these
circumstances a substantial part of these informal earnings can as well be interpreted as a redistribution of
income from spender to receiver, or as being a leaking expenditure on imports from abroad that are
physically delivered and consumed in the importing country. The case of an informal worker who does not
contribute to production, but via his spending, generates demand for more labour inputs of other to maintain
4

While this can be advantageous from the private point of view in the short run, it may discourage labour-saving
technological investments and curb economic growth in the long run.
5
Migrant workers whose labour contract expired and stay illegally in the country may form from 15% to 30% of
the labour force. They belong mostly to the low productivity skill. Since they are by definition distributed on
categories Lm, and Ln1, Ln2, and Ln3, they are thus indirectly accounted for in the model.
6
Citizens from India, Sri Lanka, Phillipines and Pakistan supply this category. Household helpers are distributed as
follows: Abu Dhabi 40%, and Dubai 26%, among others..
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his living, would lead to a further artificial surge of labour supply in the traditional sector, falling labour
productivity and rising duality.
Another category of foreign workers, which can be considered informal in a regulatory sense,
consists of foreign workers who are permitted to earn an income without registering as an establishment,
mostly in agriculture, fishing and transport. According to the population census of 1995, workers without
establishments counted 119 thousands, which is another 10% of foreign employment. 7 The profile of
these workers is for more than 90% unskilled. However, these are capable of generating a value added;
though it can be expected that in most cases such a value added is not much above what is necessary to
cover basic needs.
The two categories above are not subjected to the usual clearance procedures that apply to other
foreign workers, which require issue of business licenses, by municipal authorities, and subsequentl granting
of work permits by Ministry of Labour. The nature of their work is different and the corresponding policies
towards them differ from those for other foreign workers. But the more lenient procedures towards
admission has enhanced their inflow and contributed to an accentuation of the productivity gap and dualistic
development.
A more important category of informal workers are those manning tiny enterprises engaged in the
production of low cost goods and services that are predominantly consumed by the low productivity
labour who have an equally low purchasing power. These are enterprises that are governed by a
combination of economic motivations and social ties, and that can afford to increase employment of
unpaid or partially paid family dependants, relatives and close relations, cheaply brought from
neighbouring countries at little extra cost for the proprietor. In the context of a small family-run business,
once the proprietor/ head of the family has succeeded in securing a business license and in setting an
establishment site, it becomes more attractive for the proprietor to fetch dependants from overseas, cover
their living expenses, allocate work to them, and enhance the proprietor's esteem, than to engage in
periodical income transfers via remittances abroad. The types of activities and occupations typical of the
traditional segment are handicrafts, simple manufacturing processes, and retail and food kiosks. The
enterprises have very little capital, are highly labour intensive, have low turnovers and their clients have
a low purchasing power. With this bleak perspective in mind, this informal segment has been called by
some as the marginalised segment, de Soto (1989). Obviously, this segment, by importing more foreign
labour at the same level of activity, will be a cause for a diminishing labour productivity and increased
dualism.
7

This category is dominated by foreign workers from Pakistan, about 45%. Farmers and fisherman are the major
occupations, about 50%, followed by production and service workers in transport and trade. The over majority of the
category is unskilled, about 92 %, with the skilled forming only 8%. The foreign workers without establishments are
mostly in Abu Dhabi, 50%, followed by Dubai, 22%.
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There is more information on the profile of the informal sector, based on a sample survey organised
by MOL among 407 establishments of 1 to 10 workers in 1998, which were appropriately scrutinised to
separate those in the traditional sector from those that are oriented towards the modern sector. The
stratification yielded slightly more than 40 % of the establishments classified as informal and about 60%
for modern.8 The survey shows the traditional sector to be a cradle for the low and decreasing
productivity performance, which characterised the economy in recent years. The over majority of the low
productivity establishments, 76%, had an initial capital well below the minimum required for listed
companies, 40% experienced a decreasing turnover, and the establishments reported on average more
than one obstacle for future growth. The traditional sector depended predominantly on family labour,
mostly unpaid, and brought in from abroad. The skill profile of the remunerated workers is remarkably
low.
Another interesting detail is that the survey contained another 81 establishments run by nationals.
Application of the same stratification procedures to these divided national establishments into a
traditional segment of only 9%, while the modern profile accounted for 91%, testifying to a much lower
performance configuration among the foreign as compared to the national.
There is supplementary evidence that indicates a strong bias of small firms to attract foreign workers
from abroad, as compared to larger firms. Another survey conducted an inquiry about the required
inflow of additional foreign workers in the three years following 1996. 9 The results show that the small
firms (below 10 workers) reported a required increase of 151% on their base employment; while it is
evident ex-post that there were no prospective economic grounds for justifying such excessive increases.
The intentions can be partly understood in the light of non-economic motives to boost the demand for
family related foreign workers. The above figure can be compared with the more realistic required
increase that firms with more than 10 workers have projected: only 55 %. The bias of small firms to
overuse foreign labour is likely to be a major cause of the low labour productivity and duality tendencies.
One final point concerns the UAE economy as a whole. The profile of the inflow of attracted
foreign labour in terms of education, skill and economic activity is remarkably lower than that of the
stock to which the flow is added, and this result in a further reduction of the labour productivity in skill
equivalent terms. In table 3.2, the comparative educational profiles for several categories of active labour
are shown. To quote some figures: the ratio of low to high education among male expatriates working in
production is 9.8, roughly 10 to 1.

The ratio for nationals is 3.7. The educational gap between

expatriates and nationals is less for workers in services and is significantly reversed for government.
Finally, the low turnover of migrant workers10 downgrades the educational profile further.
8
9

The survey is reported upon in various reports issued by TANMIA, see references.
A Strategy for Emiratization, published by UAE University, 1997.
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Table 3.2. Ratio of workers with low education to those with high education, by nationality and
gender, UAE. 1995
Nationality
Nationals N
Expatriates E

Gender

Production Services

Government

Male M

3.73

2.88

8.69

Female F

0.79

0.42

1.48

Male M

9.83

3.69

4.74

Female F
6.99
2.32
0.99
Source: The ratios are calculated from a Human Resource Development Matrix for 1995, in Ibrahim, S. (2000).
Low education is secondary and below, high education is college and above.

4. An inter-industry analysis of dualistic accents in UAE
Insight into duality tendencies can be gained also from a multiplier analysis of an updated input-output
table for UAE. The input-output table, which was constructed for Abu Dhabi for 1995, cf. UNDP-UNDESA (1999), has been updated using the RAS method so as to represent the whole economy of UAE
for 2003.
The I.O. table allows calculating technical coefficients that give the deliveries of intermediate goods
of sector i to sector j as a proportion of the total production of the purchasing sector j. These coefficients
form the A matrix in eq. 7. The equation is an accounting identity stating that sectoral production q is
equal to the intermediate deliveries A q plus final demand f. The equation can be used to predict an
endogenous vector of sectoral production, q, from an appropriately inverted matrix of technical
coefficients, (I -A) -1, and a vector of exogenous final demand, f.
q = A q + f = (I -A) -1 f = M l f

(7)

The inverted matrix is the multiplier matrix, and is denoted by M.
Table 4.1 gives the multiplier matrix for UAE in 2003. Each column shows the effects of an injection of
one unit of final demand in one sector on that sector and on other sectors. An injection of 1 unit in
agriculture generates 1.016 in agriculture and 0.227 in other sectors leading to a total multiplier for
agriculture of 1.243. The highest multiplier happens to be that of public utilities giving 1.673, the lowest is
that of oil giving 1.089, which is due to a greater detachment of the oil sector from the circular flow of the
economy.
10

A greater number staying longer hinders mobility and upgrading of skills. Several sources estimate that 53.7% of
the migrant population and 51.1% of the migrant labour force of 1995 had been staying in UAE for five years or
more. Comparable percentages for those who stayed for ten years or more were, respectively, 30.7% and 29.6%.
Stickiness of migrant workers is also manifested in their response to a controlled expulsion in late 1996 when the
authorities expelled around 200 thousand immigrants without valid visas. However, many of them returned
through official channels after a six-month embargo.
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To identify the sectors to which the growth of the economy is geared to, some additional analysis of the
multipliers is required. Besides comparing the levels of the multipliers, it is also important to study the
distribution of the multiplier effects on the respective sectors and households and assess the underlying
structural bias. For instance, one should ask how the output multipliers of an injection in sector s' distribute
themselves on the individual sectors s. Eq. (8) develops such a Relative Distributive Measure of sector on
sector effects ss', denoted by RDMss' , from the multipliers matrix M, in table 4.

RDM ss ' =

(

(M

a , ss '

- d ss' )

)

∑ s M a , ss ,− 1

/

Output s ,0
∑ s Output s , 0

(8)

where the individual multiplier effect of s' on s , Ma,ss' , is divided by the column sum of multipliers of s
after deducting the initial injection. Here we use d ss’ for the Kronecker symbol that equals 1 if s=s’ and o
in other cases. The result is divided by the actual output share of sector s in year 0, as found in the input
output table for the base year, table 1 , last column.. For values of RDMss' >1, <1, and = 1, there are
positive, negative and neutral redistributive effects. For instance, values of RDMss' = 1 mean that sectoral
injections would reproduce exactly the sectoral distribution pattern of the base year.
Values of RDMhs' =1 mean that sectoral injections would reproduce exactly the initial distribution
pattern of the base year. A positive value for a particular sector s would mean an increase in its output
share relative to the base year; a negative value would mean deterioration.
To demonstrate the case of an injection in agriculture on agriculture, eq. 8 will give
{ (1.016-1.0) / (1.243 – 1.0) } / .0254 = (.016/.243) / .0254 = .0658 / .0254 = 2.59 . The case for an
injection in agriculture on oil gives RDM={ (.001) / .243 } / .237 = .017. For an injection in agriculture
on wholesale RDM is 2.69.
It can then be calculated what is the RDM in UAE of uniform injections on all sectors on each
sector. This is shown in the last column of table 4.1, and that is what matters. The results show that
sectors that succeed in gaining a higher share than their actual are manufacturing, electricity,
construction, wholesale, and transport. Of these construction is the highest. All other remaining sectors
are oriented towards losing their shares s in the economy. 11 These multiplier results can now be
combined with recent tendencies in the use of labour in the various sectors, as shown in table 4.2. The
construction sector, which has the highest positive production growth bias in the multiplier analysis, is
found also to manifest the highest decline in labour productivity; and thus

11

The declining share of the government sector is due to the specific formulation whereby indirect taxes paid by the
sectors to the government are not considered in the input-output analysis.
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Table 4.1. UAE Multiplier

0.025
0.237
0.167
0.025
0.129
0.121
0.081
0.106
0.020
0.089

(e) RDM

0.021
0.072
0.243
0.035
0.265
0.172
0.101
0.071
0.008
0.012

(d) Actual percentage
distribution of sectors

0.072
0.251
0.848
0.122
0.928
0.603
0.353
0.249
0.027
0.043
3.498

( c) Multiplier percentage
distribution on sectors

1.016 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.008 1.072
0.001 1.001 0.014 0.213 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.004 1.251
0.036 0.018 1.082 0.078 0.310 0.068 0.073 0.020 0.053 0.112 1.848
0.005 0.002 0.007 1.033 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.002 0.025 0.013 1.122
0.015 0.054 0.030 0.211 1.036 0.074 0.119 0.063 0.030 0.297 1.928
0.137 0.005 0.234 0.022 0.079 1.023 0.052 0.006 0.015 0.029 1.603
0.020 0.004 0.038 0.056 0.024 0.017 1.171 0.004 0.008 0.012 1.353
0.010 0.004 0.019 0.044 0.024 0.060 0.027 1.023 0.011 0.028 1.249
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.001 1.009 0.000 1.027
0.003 0.000 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.004 1.003 1.043
1.243 1.089 1.437 1.673 1.502 1.279 1.487 1.121 1.162 1.506 13.498
(7) (10)
(5)
(1)
(3)
(6)
(4)
(9)
(8)
(2)

(b) 1 - sum

(a) sum

government service

personal services

finance, insurance
real estate

transports, storage,
communication
wholesale retail trade
repairing services &
restaurants, hotels

construction

electricity, gas,water

manufacturing

crude oil, natural gas

primary sector
primary
crude oil
manufacturing
electricity
construction
wh rt trade
transport
finance
persl services
gvrn services
total
rank

0.812
0.303
1.449
1.421
2.051
1.423
1.248
0.675
0.395
0.138

Sources: UAE multipliers from inverted inpiu-output table. (a)= sum of rows. (b)= 1-(a). (c) = for
example, 0.021= .072/ 3.498 (d) = observed actual percentage distribution of sectors. (e) RDM = (c)/(d)
Table 4.2. Multiplier growth bias and labour productivity growth features by sector, UAE.
sector

RDM
1995-2003

RDM rank

Average annual Growth of labour
growth rate of productivity rank
labour
productivity
1994-1998
primary sector
0.81170
Declining,7
1.012
Stable, 3
Not applicable
0.826
crude oil and natural gas
0.30287
Not applicable
Rising, 2
0.942
manufacturing industries
1.44906
Declining, 10
Rising,
5
0.989
electricity, gas and water
1.42090
Stable,7
Rising, 1
0.939
Declining, 12
construction
2.05128
Rising, 3
0.942
Declining, 11
wholesale, retail trade
(a)
1.42271
Rising, 4
0.997
restaurants, hotels
(a)
1.42271
Stable, 5
Rising, 6
1.038
transports, storage, communication
1.24807
Rising, 2
Declining,8
1.049
finance, insurance
(b)
0.67502
Rising, 1
Declining,9
0.979
real estate,business services
(b)
0.67502
Stable, 8
Declining,10
1.008
social, personal services
(c)
0.39518
Stable ,4
Declining,11
0.990
domestic services
(c)
0.39518
Stable, 6
Declining,12
0.973
government services sector
0.13845
Stable,9
Sources: RDM from input output multipliers. Several sectors are combined in the input output table. This applies
to sectors indicated by a, b, and c. Column 4 is from TANMIA reports in References.

accentuating the dualistic character of economic development.

This feature is also shared by the

manufacturing sector and the wholesale and retail trade sector. All three sectors are drivers of economic
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growth and contain significant portions of the modern economy, but these sectors are also inclined to
absorb increasingly more labour and cause a decline in the aggregate labour productivity. Most of the
labour absorbed is less skilled, so that the decline in labour productivity in equivalent terms is greater.
The only sector that counteracts these dualistic tendencies is the transport, storage and communications
sector, having a positive growth bias and a rising labour productivity. All other sectors appear to play
lesser prominent roles in the dualistic tendencies.12
5. On the optimal degrees of dualistic development and open economy
The duality tendencies displayed in the previous sections are the result of the liberal policy towards
granting work licenses, and admitting foreign labour, which is further strengthened by the multi- level
decentralised system of granting work permits, and the exclusion of minimum educational levels as
conditions for admission. The duality tendencies are also due to built-in mechanismas at the sector level.
However, it can be rightly questioned: If the oversupply of low productivity labour drags the
statistical profile of productivity downwards but does not affect the higher branch of the economy in real
terms, so why worry? Besides, the welfare gains in UAE are permitted to be shared by enterprising
migrant workers from the region and this is an esteemed goal by itself, that can be seen to have positive
externalities for UAE as an attractive and a stabilising partner in the region. The open door strategy has
worked in the past, brought welfare, and if it can be prolonged, why not?
So, does duality matter? And if it matters, what is the trade-off between an open-ended liberal
economy, and a reduced duality. Economically speaking, as long as there is a large supply of low
productivity labour in neighbouring countries that is prepared to migrate to GCC and earn a wage lower
than its marginal productivity, there is economically no harm in letting the low and the high productivity
segments grow independently of each other, and thus manifesting an increasing statistical duality, so as
to say on paper. The need for and the advantages of integrating the two segments arise when the low
productivity labour becomes scarce. Under scarcity, less dualism and more integration will bring about
advantages of economies of scale and scope. Of course, more arguments are readily found from
demographic, sociological and political perspectives that favour integrative processes on dualistic

processes.
Accepting that at some point in time dualism matters, then what is the optimal degree of duality in
the light of a liberal policy towards the inflow and outflow of manpower. Some conceptual reflections
can be made on the issue, making use of Figure 5.1 below. Curve A shows how the total cost of
12

Needless to say, the above results need to be qualified to the extent of the known limitations to an I.O. analysis and
the available data for UAE.
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prospective damage due to duality decreases as the degree of control and economic integration between the
two segments increase. Curve B shows how a greater degree of control and a less liberal policy towards
labour mobility will bring more cost on the community more in terms of foregone economic welfare. By
adding the two curves together curve C is obtained. The optimum balance between costs and benefits is
achieved by a degree of control that will minimize the total cost to the community. This optimum degree of
control (Q) does not eliminate all the bad side effects of a dualism; there is thus such a conceptual thing as
an optimum degree of dualism. The degree of control may expand for as long as the total benefits

exceed the total costs. The optimum degree of control is reached as soon as the total cost is equal to the
total benefit. The optimum degree of control is therefore that which minimizes the total costs of control and
damage.
In the real world it is hardly possible to draw the above curves. Policy makers dealing with a certain
issue and alternative paths try often to make a judgement as to where their countries are positioned regarding
the alternatives vis a vis other comparable countries. Most often the policy makers of country A will try to
close ranks with the set of countries to which country A belongs, and would follow policies that converge
and convert towards the median position and empirical norms.
Given the above, the next section examines dualities in UAE in the context of the GCC, with the
purpose of reflecting on median positions.

Figure 5.1.

Cost of damage from
unconstrained dualism
& liberal economy

Cost of controlling
dualism & closing
economy

Degree of control of dualism: increasing regulation of labour market & de-liberalisation

6. Dualities in UAE and GCC: Comparative performance in the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ economy
We extend in this section the scope of duality to the treatment of what has been called the ‘old’ and
the ‘new’ economy. How do these two branches relate to each other in UAE and in the other GCC?
The plan of this section is to take up a number of indicators with readily available data and compare their
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values for UAE and the average or total for GCC as a whole, including UAE. We discuss first indicators
that reflect on and can be interpreted in terms of the ‘old’ economy, and second take up those relating to the
‘new’ economy, which is technologically the much more advanced segment, and whose development and
growth is much more recent.
Indicators that reflect on the old economy. It is generally recognised that the achievement pace in

industrial development in the UAE is ahead of the GCC. While the absolute number of industrial
establishments in UAE and Saudi Arabia are close to each other, table 6.1; in relative terms the
number of industrial establishments per capita is much higher in UAE than in Saudi Arabia or the
other GCC.

In spite of the greater industrial development of UAE compared to other GCC countries, as

Table 6.1. Number of Industrial Operating Establishments in GCC Countries in 1998
Bahrain Kuwait Oman

Qatar

Saudi

U A E Total
Arabia
Total
327
725
751
382
3,004 2,054 7,243
Source: Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting: “Industrial Data Bank” GOIC: http://www.goic.org.qa/

indicated by table 6.1, the industrial structure in UAE hides much more diversity in its manufacturing
establishments that is inclined towards smaller and traditionally operating units, with less capital labour
intensity, than the case in the other GCC. Comparative figures in the next two tables reveal a greater
prominence of lower productivities in the old economy in UAE than in GCC taken as a whole, the
underlying cause behind this being the overcrowding of the old economy with cheap foreign labour inflow.
Table 6.2 shows a relatively greater occurrence of small firms in the manufacturing sector in UAE as
compared to GCC. About 44% of manufacturing falls in the category of small firms in UAE; the figure for
GCC is 39%. The medium and large together form 56% in UAE, and for 61% in GCC. To the extent that
small firms are associated with lower productivities and the informal sector this will show itself up in a
greater duality in UAE as compared to GCC.
Table 6.2.Manufacturing: Distribution of the number of firms by size, 1998
Small

Medium
& Total
% small in % medium &
large
total
large in total
UAE
806
1040
1846
43.7%
56.3%
GCC
2766
4322
7088
39.0%
61.0%
Source: Shiha, M. (2000) P.22. Base of size distribution is the number of workers in the firm.

In Table 6.3 we present data on the number of firms in the manufacturing, their capital investment and
their employed labour. In manufacturing it is generally the case that the higher the capital/labour intensity
the greater is the productivity of the activity. The results for manufacturing show that the intensity amounts
to 56,306 US dollars of capital per worker in UAE, as compared to 145,467 in GCC; reflecting the greater
share of tiny and small enterprises in UAE referred to earlier as a cause of the low productivity.
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Table 6.3. Manufacturing: number of firms, capital, labour, and capital/labour intensity, 1998
Count

N
%
Total Capital
umbe
investment
ry
r of
mil US$
firms
UAE
1846
26.0
8362
GCC
7088
100
81367
Source: Shiha, M. (2000) P.21

%

Total
number of
labour

%

Capital
/labour
in US$

10.3
100

148509
559352

26.6
100

56306
145467

The relatively greater occurrence of low productivity activities in UAE than GCC correlate with the
relative magnitude of foreign labour inflow in UAE and GCC as can be seen from table 6.4. In 1985-95
foreign workers grew annually by 6.2% in UAE as compared to 4.5% in GCC. The result is a labour
force with 88% expatriates in UAE as compared to 74% in GCC. As this inflow puts a downward
pressure on the labour productivity, this pressure is bound to be greater in UAE than in GCC.
Table 6.4 National and foreign labour force , in millions, distribution and growth, 1985 – 1995.
Country

National

UAE
0.11
GCC
2.53
Source: Girgis ,2000 .

Foreign

Total

0.85
7.04

0.96
9.57

National
%
in
total
11.6 %
26.4%

Foreign
%
in
total
88.4%
73.6%

National
% annual
growth
5.5%
2.1%

Foreign
% annual
growth
6.2%
4.5%

Indicators that reflect on the ‘new’ economy. The next four brief tables give an idea on the magnitude
and shape of inputs that determine productivity performance in the new modern economy, in particular the
high tech. Table 6.5 gives expenditure on higher education per capita in UAE and GCC. The figures show
that UAE’s devotes about half the resources per capita compared to GCC, i.e. 63 US$ compared to 102 US$.
Table 6.5. Expenditures on higher education institutes in million US$, expenditure per capita, 1996.
Countr
y

Ministry
of higher
Educatio
n

Govern
ment
Univers
ities

Non – Governm Non
– Total
Per
capita
govern
ent
governm
Expendit expenditure
ment
Technical ent
ure in all on
higher
Univers Institutes Technical higher
education
ities
Institutes education (US $ )
UAE
6.2
103
23.1
11.8
6.1
150.2
63
GCC
98.2
2 827.9 37.3
125
6.1
3094.5
102
Source: Adapted from ESCWA –UNESCO, Research and Development System in the Arab States: Development of
Science and Technology Indicators, 1998 ( E/ ESCWA/ TECH/ 1998/Rev. 1)

Going a step further by focusing on science and technology (S and T) within higher education, it is
apparent from table 6.6 that UAE focuses slightly more on these disciplines than GCC, with 38% studying
these topics in UAE as compared to 34% in GCC.
Table 6.6. Number of Students according to level, and percentage of these students studying a Science
and Technology discipline (S and T), 1996
Country
UAE
Total number

Bachelor’s
14 691

Master’s

Ph.D.

Higher dipl Technical inst

Total

213

294

0

18 150

2 952

15

% of S and T
33.3
54.5
55.4
0
59.4
38.1
GCC
Total number
282 835
7 069
2 915 1 634
30 067
324520
% of S and T
31.67
46.78
53.13 14.73
56.97
33.88
Source: Adapted from ESCWA –UNESCO, Research and Development System in the Arab States: Development of
Science and Technology Indicators, 1998 ( E/ ESCWA/ TECH/ 1998/Rev. 1)

The general picture of relatively less resources put in higher education in UAE, applies to R and D as
well, as shown in table 6.7.
Table 6.7. R & D expenditure and number of full –time equivalent researchers and support staff, 1996
Coun
try

R and D R and Numbe Number of Number of Number of R Ratio of R
expenditu D
r
of FTE
R and D and
D and
D
re
expendi FTE
researchers support
support
expenditure
(Millions ture per researc per
personnel personnel
to number
of
US capita
hers
100,000
per 100,000 of
FTE
dollars)
persons
population
researchers
UAE
10.89
4.64
107
4.5
206
8.6
101.7
GCC
294.05
11.52
1 595
6.1
2 868
11
184.4
Source: Adapted from ESCWA –UNESCO, Research and Development System in the Arab States: Development of
Science and Technology Indicators 1998 (E/ ESCWA/ TECH/ 1998/3)

The staffing of the R and D effort in public institutions appears to be less experienced in UAE than in
GCC as apparent from table 6.8, with more MSc than PhD degrees held in UAE. These are evenly divided
in GCC.
Table 6.8. Distribution of Full – Time Equivalent Researchers (FTER), 1996
Country

PhD FTER

MSc FTER

Total FTER

UAE
number
38
69
107
%distributio
35.5
64.5
100
GCC
number
781
814
1595
%
48.97
51.03
100
Source: Adapted from ESCWA –UNESCO, Research and Development System in the Arab States: Development of
Science and Technology Indicators 1998(E/ ESCWA/ TECH/ 1998/3)

So much for direct and indirect statistics on productivity enhancing inputs in higher education and in
R and D, which are evidently directed to and focused on the modern segment. The publicly financed
input in UAE is on average lower than in GCC. There is no data to compliment the picture with private
and corporate sources of finance for R and D, though this may be substantial in UAE.
The next set of indicators deals with outcomes as a result of the above documented input effort.
There are in total ten different indicators pertaining to various activities in the high tech modern segment
that will be reviewed below.

They relate in various ways to different factor productivities and

productivity performance. Practically all these indicators will be shown to point to higher performance
levels of UAE as compared to GCC.
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Table 6.9 shows the extent of published papers in S and T disciplines, and those that were jointly coauthored with foreign institutions. Two productivity indicators can be calculated. The number of papers per
full time equivalent researcher shows UAE performing less than GCC in 1990 but is catching up in 1995,
with about 1.3 publication per FTER, compared to 1.7 for GCC. Notwithstanding, the international
exposure of the research effort in UAE is greater than in GCC, with twice as much international exposure.
The table shows the joint percentage for UAE at 40% and for GCC at 21%.
Table 6.9. Publications. Productivity indicators of papers per FTER and the share of joint papers. 1990
and 1995
Country

1990
Total
papers

1995
Product Joint
Joint
Total
Product Joint
Joint
ivity
paper %
No. of ivity
paper
%
papers/ s
papers
papers/ s
FTER
FTER
UAE
49
0.46
33
67.3
137
1.28
55
40.1
GCC
1,722
1.08
468
27.2
2, 716
1.70
568
20.9
Source: ESCWA 1999 “Science and Technology Policies and Strategies for the Twenty First Century”.P.13.
No.

of

Table 6.10 presents electronically published data on patents originating from a number of the GCC
countries that registered in the United States during the period 1990- 1999. While no information is available
on the patent title or area of application, the small number of patents registered by operators in the GCC is
noteworthy. The comparatively small number of 170 patents generated, probably by foreign institutions
operating in the Gulf countries, indicates the initially low level of innovative activity taking place in the
region compared with other developing countries with a longer experience in technological development
such as Korea, Chile, and others, with ranges between 356 and 1343 patents during the same period.
Calculating the number of patents per billion dollars of invested capital gives a productivity index for UAE
of 1.8 patents, which is not far from that for the GCC of 2.1 patents. In interpreting patent figures, it is
important to keep in mind that innovative firms may prefer not to file for patent rights for their innovations,
such a decision being part of its competitive strategy. There is no information on this aspect in UAE and
GCC.

Table 6.10. Number of registered United States patents originating from the Gulf, 1990- 1999.
Country

1990- 1995 – Total Capital investment
94
99
Patents billion. $
UAE
7
8
15
8.36
GCC
50
120
170
81.37
Source: United States Patent and Trademark office web site: www.uspto.gov

Patents/
investment

capital
1.79
2.09

Table 6.11 provides an overview of technology transfer activities undertaken by GCC countries in areas
that relate to information and telecommunication technologies during the period 1992 and 1998. The highest
value of contracts in information technologies is achieved by UAE, followed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. The
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highest value of contracts in telecommunication technologies are achieved by Saudi Arabia followed by
UAE, Kuwait. On the average, the figures of contract values per capita show UAE to be three times as
much as the GCC, compare 694 US$ for UAE with 229 US$ for GCC. This supports the argument that as
far as productive performance in the high tech modern sector is concerned, the UAE performs remarkably
much better than the GCC.
Table 6.11. Contracts Involving Technology Transfer in Information Technology and
Telecommunications, in millions of US dollars. 1992-1998.
Country / area

Populati
on
in
millions

Information
Technology

Telecommunicatio
ns

Value US$ p.c. Value
United Arab Emirates
2.345
46.0
20
1587.6
GCC
25.533
132.3 14
4468.5
Source: Middle East Economic Digest : MEED 1992-1998

Information
technology
plus
telecommunication
US$ p.c. Value
US$ p.c.
674
1633.6
694
215
4600.8
229

Table 6.12 provides data on advanced methods of information technology and communication
networks in the Gulf countries. In terms of internet subscribers per 1,000 people, the UAE has the highest
number. The same applies for internet users. In terms of internet host per 10,000 people, the highest
number was registered in UAE as well. The highest number of top level domain names was registered in
UAE. The largest number of personal computer per 1,000 people was registered in Qatar, followed directly
by UAE. Finally, the largest number of cellular subscribers was registered again in UAE. These were six
indicators relating to productivity in the ‘new’ economy, All indicators show that UAE occupies the top
position in the GCC region, suggesting that the most advanced technological branch of the economy is
performing at a higher level of productivity in UAE than the GCC region.
Table 6.12. Performance indicators of advanced methods of information technology and
communication networks, around 2000. Facilities per 1,000 peersons, except dmain names.
UAE
66.8
166.9
822
106.2
2.1
19.718
GCC
12.3
32.4
98
57.9
6..3
28.441
Sources: Internet Arab World Magazine 2000, ITU web site http: // www.itu.int 2000, Internet Software Consortium
domain surveys of January 2000, http: // www.isc.org

7. Consolidation of the comparative results
The results of the above indicators can be consolidated to give a more compact standpoint as regards the
extent of dualities in UAE and the GCC. We treat first indicators that reflect indirectly on the ‘old’
economy, and take up later the ‘new’ economy, which is technologically much more modern oriented.
The old economy. We distinguish here between two structural indicators, X .
X1 = percentage of firms with medium and large labour size in the whole economy, from table 6.2, col.6.
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X2 = capital labour intensity in the whole economy, from table 6.3, col. 8.

Although these indicators refer to the whole economy, they indirectly tell more on the old than the
new economy since the share of the old economy dominates the whole economy. The value of an
indicator for a country is indexed to fall between 0 and 1, as it is divided by, or expressed in terms of, the
highest value between the two countries. The obtained indexed values of the two indicators are then
averaged to give Avg that can be seen as a summary norm.
In Figure 7.1, the indexed values of the two X variables are plotted for UAE and GCC, as well as
their AVG. Fig. 7.1 demonstrates the inferiority of UAE when compared to GCC as regards structural
features of the old economy segment.

Index

Figure 7.1. Structural indicators of the old economy
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00

Avg.
structural indicators X

X1

X2
UAE

GCC

The new economy. There is more data available on this segment that allows considering more
indicators. Take several Z indicators as indicative of outputs and obtain their indexed values as was
explained. The list of Z indicators, previously examined in section 6, is below.
Z1 = research papers published per full-time equivalent researcher, (table 9, col 7)
Z2= percentage of joint papers published with international scientists, (table 9, col 9)
Z3= patents issued per billion$ of capital investment, (table 10, col 6)
Z4= Contracts of ICT in dollars per capita, (table 11, col 8)
Z5 to Z10= indicators of computer use, internet, cellular etc. (table 12 col 2 to col 7)
Avg= simple average of all ten indices.

In Figure 7.2 the indexed values of Z are plotted for the new economy in UAE and GCC. Here one sees
opposite results to those obtained in figure 1 for the old economy. UAE is better off than GCC. Results show
superiority of UAE in the new economy. The picture for UAE is that of a highly dualistic economy- lagging
regarding the old economy but leaping regarding the new economy.
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Index

Figure 7.2. Output indicators of the new economy
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Another category of indicators for the new economy is Y. These indicators relate to inputs, are
indexed as explained earlier, and were examined in section 6 also. The indicators consist are below.
Y1 = Per capita expenditure on higher education in US $, ( table 6.5 , col 8)
Y2 = R & D expenditure per capita in US $, (table 6.7 col 3)
Y3 = |Number of FTER per 100,000 population, (table 6.7, col 5)
Y4 =Number of R & D support personnel per 100,000 population (Source table 7, col 7)
Avg= simple average of all four input variables.

In figure 7.3 the indexed values are plotted, showing what is already very well known: there are
relatively less public inputs in scientific education in the UAE than in GCC.
Now that the average results, AVG, for outputs and inputs indicators for the new economy are
calculated, it can be further investigated in which country the relationship between outputs and inputs
would appear to be more efficient in the new modern economy.

Figure 7.3. Input indicators of the new economy
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An important conclusion is that in spite of the relatively lower inputs there is on average
higher outputs in UAE than in GCC, as can be gathered from a division of the average outputs
of Z by the average inputs of Y. An indicator of overall productivity in the new economy is
obtainable by dividing output by input, as is done below. The output /input ratio, expressed as
Z/Y, is 1.47 for UAE, as compared to 0.52 for GCC; indicating higher efficiency in managing
resources and reaching higher levels in the new economy in UAE compared to GCC.
8. Concluding remarks
If there is a prospective cost of a greater duality, such a cost needs to be weighed against the economic
welfare advantages accruing to nationals and expatriates from a liberal policy towards human resource
mobility that encourages duality. In the longer run, and under increasing economic scarcity and other
demographic, sociological and political considerations greater degrees of integration between dual segments
can be more optimal than no integration.
Given the complexity of the issues it is understandable that policy directions are retrieved from the
comparative experiences of neighbouring countries. The conclusion from a comparative empirical review of
GCC is that the divergence in productivity levels in the UAE economy is significantly greater than in the
other GCC economies. The ‘old’ economy in UAE lags when compared to GCC. In contrast, the ‘new’
economy leaps even much more in UAE than in GCC, and is likely to be more efficiently managed in terms
of the ratio of outputs to inputs. The proposition that UAE economy is more dualistic than GCC is correct.
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